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CORPORATIONS
by
Robert F. Gray, Jr.* and Gregory J Sergesketter**

EXAS courts rendered several noteworthy decisions in the area of
Texas corporation law during the current annual Survey period. In
particular, the decisions addressed corporate disregard, shareholder
derivative actions, director indemnification claims, and application of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act to the sale of securities.
I.

CORPORATE DISREGARD

The tendency of Texas courts to disregard the corporate entity has long
been recognized' and appears to have continued unabated, notwithstanding
recent legislative pronouncements to the contrary. 2 During the current Survey period many courts have continued to follow the rationale espoused by
the supreme court in Castleberry v. Branscum,3 but only one has cited the
* B.B.A., M.B.A., The University of Michigan; J.D., The University of San Diego;
LL.M., New York University; Attorney at Law, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
** B.B.A., J.D., University of Notre Dame; Attorney at Law, Fulbright & Jaworski,
Houston, Texas.
1. Minchen v. Van Trease, 425 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. In 1989, the Texas legislature adopted amendments to the Texas Business Corporation
Act with respect to the liability of shareholders of a corporation for the obligations of the
corporation. In particular, the relevant statutes read as follows:
A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in shares, or a subscriber
for shares whose subscription has been accepted shall be under no obligation to
the corporation or to its obligees with respect to ... (1) any contractual obligation of the corporation on the basis of actual or constructive fraud, or a sham to
perpetrate a fraud, unless the obligee demonstrates that the holder, owner, or
subscriber caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and
did perpetrate an actual fraud on obligee primarily for direct personal benefit of
the holder, owner, or subscriber.
TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.21A (Vernon Supp. 1991). Additionally, "the laws of the
jurisdiction of incorporation of a foreign corporation shall govern the liability, if any, of shareholders of the foreign corporation for the debts, liabilities, and obligations for which the shareholders of the foreign corporation are not otherwise liable by statute or agreement." TEx.
Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 8.02A (Vernon Supp. 1991); see Gray & Sergesketter, Corporations,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 225, 226-27 (1990).

3. 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986). Castleberrypermits disregarding of the corporate fiction
(or piercing the corporate veil)
when the corporate form has been used as part of a basically unfair device to
achieve an unequitable result, [and more specifically:] (1) when the fiction is
used as a means of perpetrating fraud [including constructive fraud, which is
defined as the breach of some legal or equitable duty]; (2) where a corporation is
organized and operating as a mere tool or business conduit of another corporation [the alter ego theory]; (3) where the corporate fiction is resorted to as a
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recent statutory pronouncements, and that cite was contained in a dissenting
opinion. 4 In most circumstances, the statutes eliminate actual and constructive fraud and sham to perpetrate a fraud as bases for piercing the corporate
veil and holding shareholders liable for the contractual obligations of the
corporation.
In addition, the Supreme Court of Texas recently gave its imprimatur to
the filing of additional lawsuits against potential shareholder defendants until the applicable statute of limitations5 has expired following the entry of a
judgment with respect to the underlying cause of action. 6 In Matthews Construction Co. v. Rosen 7 Matthews Construction Company entered into a contract in March 1979 with Houston Pipe & Supply Company (HP&S) of
which Harvey Rosen was president and sole shareholder. Matthews sued
HP&S on June 21, 1979, for breach of the contract and obtained a judgment
for approximately $300,000 on July 26, 1982. Unable to collect on the judgment against HP&S, Matthews sought to pierce the corporate veil by filing
suit against Rosen on February 20, 1984, and was subsequently awarded
damages by the trial court. Relying on "well-settled Texas law" the court of
appeals determined that constructive fraud, sham to perpetrate a fraud, and
alter ego were not separate causes of action that could withstand the affirmative defense of statute of limitations. 8 Such corporate disregard theories are
only a means for the injured party to pursue a remedy against an additional
defendant who would otherwise be immune.9 The court of appeals held that
although the period of limitations should be suspended to provide the claimant with his day in court, it should not be tolled if the effect is to provide the
claimant with an additional opportunity to bring the same cause of action
against another defendant after he has exhausted his original process. 10
Consequently, even though Matthews was able to pierce the corporate veil,
he was not able to secure a judgment against Rosen since the statutory limimeans of evading an existing legal obligation; (4) where the corporate fiction is
employed to achieve or perpetrate monopoly; (5) where the corporate fiction is
used to circumvent a statute; and (6) where the corporate fiction is relied upon
as a protection of crime or to justify wrong.
In addition, as a footnote the court listed inadequate capitalization as another basis. Id. at
271-72.
4. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
5. In a footnote to the holding in the Matthews case, the supreme court left open the
question of whether the appropriate limitations period should be that of the underlying cause
of action (in that case an additional four years), or the period in which to enforce a judgment
- an additional ten yearsl Matthews Constr. Co., Inc. v. Rosen, 796 S.W.2d 692, 694 n.3
(Tex. 1990).
6. In another footnote in Matthews, Justice Spears explained that the underlying cause of
action in that case was for breach of contract and that "(flor purposes of discussion, we refer to
Matthews' suit as an 'alter ego' suit; however, the mere fact that a corporation operates as an
alter ego does not give rise to a separate and independent cause of action and this opinion
should not be so construed." Id. at 692 n. 1.
7. 796 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1990).
8. Rosen v. Matthews Constr. Co., 777 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1989), rev'd, 796 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1990).
9. Id. at 437.
10. Id. at 441.
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tations period had expired.' 1 The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the
court of appeals, however, and held that once Matthews filed suit against
HP&S in June 1979, the limitations period was tolled as to HP&S's alter ego
until final judgment.1 2 Although the court acknowledged the need for reasonable limitations periods "so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend while witnesses are available,"' 13 the court permitted
Matthews to commence a separate suit against Rosen, which was the basis
for this action, more than five years following the underlying breach of
contract.
In the interest of judicial efficiency and finality, claimants seeking to pierce
the corporate veil based upon alter ego should be required to join the potential alter ego defendant if a separate suit against the alter ego defendant is
not commenced prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Recently,
the Texas legislature has sought to improve the business climate in Texas by
providing the shareholders of Texas corporations with more certainty of limited liability for the contractual obligations of the corporation. However,
once again Justice Spears has apparently attempted to facilitate the ability of
plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil of Texas corporations and disregard the
4
limited liability aspects granted by the Texas legislature.1
In Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States,'5 a case involving reverse piercing of the corporate veil, various corporations brought suit against the
United States to quiet title to real property and discharge Federal tax liens
placed on the property as a result of a federal tax jeopardy assessment. The
corporate structure with respect to the plaintiffs-appellants was complex.
Fadhlalla Haeri and Hamid Jafar formed and operated a partnership, Project Development Company (PDC), until Mr. Haeri decided "to abandon
the business world and devote his time to studying and teaching the Islamic
faith."' 16 After making his decision, Mr. Haeri transferred his forty-seven
percent ownership interest in PDC to Mr. Jafar who subsequently formed
the Haeri Trust with Mr. Haeri as its sole beneficiary. Mr. Jafar funded the
Haeri Trust with, inter alia, forty-seven shares of PDC, 500 shares of Dar
Al-Hikmah N.V., Inc. and all the shares of Mudin, Inc.
Dar A-Hikmah and Mudin corporations held real property on which the
Haeris, their guests and servants lived at no cost, and both corporations paid
for the personal living expenses of the Haeris. The Federal Government
asked the court to hold the two corporate entities, Dar A-Hikmah N.V.,
Inc. and Mudin, Inc., accountable for the tax obligations of the Haeris who
11. Id. at 442.
12. Matthews Constr. Co. v. Rosen, 796 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. 1990); see also Nelson v.
Schanzer, 788 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (court held
filing against alter ego corporation tolled running of limitations against individual owner of
alter ego corporation).
13. Matthews, 796 S.W.2d at 694 (citing Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348,
351 (Tex. 1990)).
14. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
15. 910 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1990).
16. Id. at 241.
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were not shareholders of record of those entities.' 7
In this reverse piercing case, the district court found three bases for disregarding the corporate fictions of Dar AI-Hikmah and Mudin - alter ego,
illegal purpose, and sham to perpetrate fraud. 18 The court of appeals determined that under Texas law a reverse piercing case is permitted only where
the basis for piercing the corporate veil is alter ego and not illegal purpose or
sham to perpetrate a fraud.' 9 The Federal Government could thus reach the
assets of Dar A1-Hikmah and Mudin only upon showing an alter ego relationship between the Haeris and the corporations. No doubt existed as to
the extensive relationship and unity between the corporations and the
Haeris. 20 Since the Haeris were not shareholders of Dar Al-Hikmnah or
Mudin, the extensive relationship alone did not establish an alter ego basis
for piercing the corporate veil. 2 1 Texas courts will not treat a corporation
and an individual as one unless the individual has an ownership interest in
the corporation. 22 The court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether, under Texas trust law, the Haeris had a present ownership
interest in the Haeri Trust and whether such ownership interest was sufficient to conclude that the Haeris were shareholders of Mudin and Dar Al23
Hikmah.
In a recent case before the Texas Supreme Court, Justice Spears, over a
strong dissent, extended the alter ego basis for piercing the corporate veil by
24
using a restricted review of the evidence. In Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper
Mancorp, Inc. (Mancorp), as contractor, sued Culpepper Properties, Inc.
(CPI), as owner, and John C. Culpepper, Jr. (Culpepper), as the sole shareholder of CPI on the basis of alter ego.25 The suit alleged breach of a con17. Normally, the corporate veil is pierced to permit creditors of the corporation to recover from the corporation's shareholders for the debts of the corporation. In Zahra, however, the court was asked to pierce the corporate veil and hold the corporations liable for the
debts of the Haeris - a reverse piercing case.
18. Id. at 243.
19. Id. at 244; see Zisblatt v. Zisblatt, 693 S.W.2d 944, 955 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985,
writ dism'd); Dillingham v. Dillingham, 434 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1968, writ dism'd); American Petroleum Exch. v. Lord, 399 S.W.2d 213, 216-17 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
20. Zahra, 910 F.2d at 245.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 246.
23. Id.
24. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 157 (Dec. 12, 1990).
25. Observance of corporate formalities was an important factor in the majority's decision. Id. Because, as noted in the dissenting opinion of Justices Phillips and Hecht, the trial
occurred prior to August 28, 1989, the effective date of TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21A
(Vernon Supp. 1991), these amendments to the Texas Business Corporation Act were not applicable in this case. The amendment states in relevant part:
A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in shares, or a subscriber
for shares whose subscription has been accepted shall be under no obligation to
the corporation or to its obligees with respect to ... (3) any contractual obligation of the corporation on the basis of the failure of the corporation to observe
any corporate formality, including without limitation: (a) the failure to comply
with any requirement of [the Texas Business Corporation] Act or of the articles
of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation; or (b) the failure to observe any
requirement prescribed by (the Texas Business Corporation] Act or by the arti-
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struction contract under which Mancorp built the First Bank Galleria
building for CPI. The jury found against CPI and, by piercing the corporate
veil on the basis of alter ego, held Culpepper jointly liable. The trial court,
however, rendered judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the finding of
alter ego, which judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals. The Texas
Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded the alter ego finding for
further consideration.
Citing Sherman v. FirstNationalBank,26 Garcia v. InsuranceCo. ofPa.,27
and Williams v. Bennett,28 the Texas Supreme Court adopted the evidentiary
standard that, when reviewing a no evidence basis for overturning a finding
that a shareholder is liable for the obligations of a corporation as its alter
ego, an appellate court is limited to reviewing only the evidence tending to
support the jury's verdict and must disregard all other evidence to the contrary.29 Then, if more than a scintilla of evidence supports the jury's findings, the jury's findings must be upheld.30 On this basis, the Texas Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals for drawing inferences
from the evidence
31
that tended to support the trial court's judgment.
The dissent correctly pointed out that the no evidence review standard
contains an inherent inconsistency between the test for alter ego and its limited evidentiary review. "If a jury must consider the total dealings between a
corporation and an individual before it can find alter ego, it is hardly appropriate to review the propriety of an affirmative finding by looking only to
those dealings which might imply alter ego." 32 Justices Phillips and Hecht
in their dissent noted that courts, in no evidence reviews, have also acknowledged the inherent inconsistencies and have called for a reform of the review
standard. 33 Therefore, extension of the no evidence review standard to alter
ego reviews would be clearly improvident. The legal sufficiency of evidence
to support an alter ego finding should be determined by reviewing all the
evidence, not just evidence and inferences most favorable to the finding. 34
Using a two-step analysis for proving alter ego, the Supreme Court found
first that all of the pieces of evidence tending to show alter ego taken together constituted more than the scintilla of evidence required for supporting a finding by the jury that there was such unity between the corporation
cles of incorporation or bylaws for acts to be taken by the corporation, its board
of directors, or its shareholders.
TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.21A (Vernon Supp. 1991). Therefore, the failure to observe
corporate formalities will not in the future be a factor considered by the courts when asked to
disregard the corporate entity and hold its shareholders liable for the contractual obligations of
the corporation.
26. 760 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1988).

27. 751 S.W.2d 857, 858 (Tex. 1988).
28. 610 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. 1980).

29. Mancorp, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.at 157.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 161 n.1 (Phillips & Hecht, JJ., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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and the individual that the separateness of the corporation had ceased. 35
Secondly, more than a scintilla of evidence existed to support a finding that
36
failure to pierce the corporate veil would result in injustice or inequity.
Even using the majority's articulated evidentiary standard, the paucity of
alter ego evidence is overwhelming. Rather than basing their conclusions on
clear inferences of an alter ego relationship gleaned from the evidence, the
majority appears to merely rely on evidence which gives, at best, an ambiguous inference as to the nature of the relationship. The court found sufficient
facts to meet the first test, that there was such unity between the corporation
37
and the individual that the separateness of the corporation had ceased.
The first basis to satisfy this initial test involved failure to follow corporate
formalities. 38 CPI's observance of corporate formalities is not entirely clear,
39
and even if it was, that alone is not enough to imply alter ego.
4
Secondly, the court relied on payment of CPI's debts by Culpepper. 0
Even if the evidence supported the finding that Culpepper personally paid
for CPI's debts, this evidence runs counter to the reasons alter ego is alleged.
If CPI had been paying for Culpepper's debts or Culpepper had commingled
funds with CPI, this would have been indicative of Culpepper stripping CPI
of its assets for his benefit. Culpepper should be rewarded, not punished, for
increasing the net worth of CPI and its ability to pay its liabilities when he
personally paid CPI's debts. Instead the court punishes Culpepper by making him personally liable for all debts of CPI.
Culpepper's business card provided a third basis for meeting the initial
test. 4 1 The statement on Culpepper's business card, "Culpepper Properties,
Inc., John C. Culpepper, Jr., his self,"'42 is at best ambiguous. It is more of
an indication of the separate capacities in which Culpepper operated his separate businesses. Culpepper had one business card that served all of his purposes instead of a separate card for each business. This is indicative of the
lengths to which the majority is willing to stretch the inference.
Lastly, the court emphasized the statement that Culpepper personally
backed the project. 43 This basis is also very weak in its inference of an alter

ego relationship. Because Culpepper had personally guaranteed the con44
struction loan, he was correct in stating that he was "behind the project."
However, such a statement cannot be interpreted to mean that CPI and Culpepper are one in the same entities, especially since the contract with
Mancorp was signed with CPI by Culpepper as President. As the dissent
35. Id. at 158.
36. Id. According to the majority, inequity in contract cases frequently results from reasonable
become
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

reliance on the financial backing of the corporation's owners should the corporation
insolvent. Id.
Mancorp, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 157-58.
Id. at 157.
See Torregrossa v. Szelc, 603 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Tex. 1980).
Mancorp, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 157-58.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id.
Mancorp, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 158.
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points out, "[tihe jury could reasonably have suspected that John Culpepper
treated [CPI] as his alter ego, .. but it could not have inferred alter ego
'45
from this record.
The second test, that failure to pierce the corporate veil would result in
injustice or inequity, was based on 1) Mancorp relying on Culpepper's misleading representations to the effect that he was "behind the project," and 2)
the mortgage company foreclosing on the project and two of the project's
creditors remaining unpaid.4 6 No doubt exists that Mancorp's contract was
with CPI, not Culpepper. If Mancorp was concerned about CPI's ability to
perform the contract, Mancorp should have acted as CPI's construction
lender did in obtaining Culpepper's personal guaranty. As Mancorp did not,
it therefore unreasonably relied on Culpepper being personally liable for the
project. Nevertheless, the court grants Mancorp Culpepper's personal guaranty, though not bargained for, due to the perceived injustice that otherwise
would have occurred. That, however, is not the injustice. If any injustice
exists it is in providing the equivalent of personal guaranties to those who do
not give a commensurate exchange of value. If a person bargains to receive a
personal guaranty, a commensurate exchange of value normally is required.
Those persons who have the foresight to obtain such guaranties are placed at
a disadvantage when courts are willing to grant those plaintiffs who must
rely solely on alter ego the equivalent of the stockholder's personal guaranty.
II.

DERIVATIVE ACTIoNs

Generally, an individual shareholder of a Texas corporation does not have
a separate and independent cause of action for injuries suffered by the corporation that result in the depreciation of the value of the shareholder's
shares. 47 The courts have found an exception to this rule, however, where
the shareholder has a cause of action for personal damages as a result of the
breach of a duty owed directly by a person to the shareholder, whether arising from contract or otherwise.4 While most courts have viewed this as an
exception to the general rule, at least one court during the Survey period
correctly recognized it as an otherwise separate cause of action that is not
dependent upon the relationship of the parties to the corporation. 49
Whether the wrong is against the corporation solely or against the shareholder personally determines the party that may bring the cause of action. 50
Recently, some courts in Texas have blurred this distinction by permitting
shareholders to bring actions in their individual capacity for what are in
essence wrongs against the corporation. As in the corporate disregard cases
discussed above, this trend has resulted in the erosion of the concept of the
corporation as a separate legal entity.
45. Id. at 163 (emphasis in original).
46. Id. at 158-59.
47. Massachusetts v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398, 407, 168 S.W.2d 216, 221 (Tex. 1942), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 210 (1943).
48. Id. at 408, 168 S.W.2d at 222.
49. Faour v. Faour, 789 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied).
50. Id. at 622.
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In Bush v. Brunswick Corp.51 shareholders of ICO intervened in a suit
against Brunswick Corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, ICO Transitory, Inc. (Transitory). The suit alleged anticipatory breach of a merger
agreement whereby Brunswick, through a merger of its subsidiary into ICO,
was to acquire all the shares of ICO stock for $7.00 per share. The court
framed the issue as whether the parties to the merger agreement intended the
shareholders to have an independent cause of action for the diminution in
the value of their shares of ICO stock as a result of an alleged anticipatory
breach of the merger agreement by Brunswick and Transitory.5 2 ICO sued
Brunswick and Transitory for the alleged breach. Brunswick then filed a
special exception alleging that the decrease in the value of the ICO shares
could only have affected the individual shareholders of ICO, and thus ICO
lacked standing or a justiciable interest to recover for the decreased value.
The seven majority shareholders of ICO filed a petition in intervention seeking class certification and damages for the diminution in the value of their
shares caused by Brunswick's alleged anticipatory breach of the merger
agreement. In reviewing the terms of the merger agreement, the trial court
held that the shareholders were not parties to the agreement or third party
beneficiaries entitled to bring suit to enforce it, and struck the shareholders'
petition in intervention.5 3 Based upon some hypertechnical analysis of the
language of the agreement, the court of appeals reversed the trial court and
held that the shareholders were third party beneficiaries of the merger agreement 54 and were not barred from bringing suit for a breach of the agreement.5 5 In effect, this decision means that shareholders of Texas
corporations are allowed to bring suit against potential acquirors for breach
of acquisition agreements between their corporations and the acquiring entity. In all likelihood, this decision will result in another 56 disincentive for
anyone seeking to acquire a Texas corporation.
When two corporations enter into a merger agreement, the shareholders
57
of the company to be acquired generally are not parties to the agreement.
Since the board of directors of an acquired Texas corporation is responsible
to ensure that the best interests of the corporation's shareholders are
achieved, the acquired corporation is the appropriate body to negotiate and
enter into the merger agreement that is subsequently approved by its shareholders. 58 In Bush, however, a contract dispute between Brunswick, Transitory, and ICO evolved and breathed life into the "Frankenstein monster" of
51. 783 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, writ denied).
52. Id. at 725.
53. Id. at 726.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 729-30.
56. See infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
57. In a merger, the Texas statutes provide for the corporations to be parties to the plan of
merger and require that the articles of merger be executed by each corporation to the merger.
TEX. Bus. CORp. ACT ANN. arts. 5.01A & 5.04A (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1991). There exists
no similar requirement with respect to shareholders of the constituent corporations.
58. A shareholder of a Texas corporation has the right to dissent from certain corporate
actions and seek an appraisal of the fair value of his shares of stock. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. arts. 5.11-.13 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1991).
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a class action suit. 59 Ample opportunity to attack any transaction is thereby
granted to various parties under various theories. ICO additionally had the
right to sue for its damages sustained under the terms of the unfulfilled
merger agreement. Also, ICO could have pursued the remedy of specific
performance against Brunswick and Transitory to recoup the diminution in
ICO's stock value. With those remedies, both ICO and its shareholders were
well protected. However, the court has apparently now authorized the corporation's shareholders as another protected class that may seek damages
independently for the breach of a corporate contract through the class action
mechanism.
In Eye Site, Inc. v. Blackburn 60 the Texas Supreme Court held that a sole
dissenting shareholder had standing to bring a shareholder's derivative suit
against the other shareholders. 61 The defendants argued that the plaintiff
lacked standing because, under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), a plaintiff may not maintain a derivative suit if "the plaintiff does not fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the shareholders similarly situated
...."62

The defendants argued that the requirements of rule 42(a) had not

been met since there were no other shareholders similarly situated. The 63
trial
court agreed and dismissed the suit, and the court of appeals affirmed.
The suit arose after two optometrists formed a corporation to provide eye
care services and gave the plaintiff twenty-five percent of the shares of stock
of the corporation in return for the plaintiff's help in obtaining financing for
the corporation. When the two original shareholders became disillusioned
with the plaintiff's ability to obtain financing, they formed a new corporation and dissolved the old one. The new corporation obtained financing and
opened thirty-eight new stores, all without the plaintiff's involvement. The
plaintiff filed a shareholder's derivative suit on behalf of the old corporation,
claiming that the other two shareholders had diverted business opportunities
to their new corporation.
In an opinion written by Justice Cook, the Texas Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals, reasoning that neither rule 42(a) nor the rule's legislative history indicated any intention to preclude a sole dissenting shareholder
from maintaining a derivative action. 64 The purpose of the rule, the court
continued, was to prevent a shareholder from bringing a derivative suit
"without fairly and adequately representing 'similarly situated' shareholders."' 65 Noting that the rule places no minimum on the number of "similarly
situated" shareholders required to maintain a suit, the court held that "if the
plaintiff is the only shareholder 'similarly situated', he is in compliance with
59. See San Antonio Tele. Co. v. American Tele. & Tele. Co., 68 F.R.D. 435, 436 (W.D.
Tex. 1975).
60. 796 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1990).
61. Id. at 163.
62. Id. at 161 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(a)).
63. Id. at 160; see Gray, Vletas & Waters, Corporations and Partnerships, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 221, 236-38 (1989).
64. Eye Site, 796 S.W.2d at 162.
65. Id.
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both the letter and the purpose of the rule."' 66 The court concluded by questioning the wisdom of construing the rule in such a way that would prevent a
shareholder from enforcing his or her rights. 67 In light of the fact that the
corporation in this case was the damaged entity and, therefore, the proper
party to bring the suit rather than the shareholder in his individual capacity,
the court appears to have reached the correct result. To have held otherwise, while following the general rule in Massachusetts v. Davis, 68 would

have left an aggrieved shareholder of a corporation that has been damaged
by all of his fellow shareholders without a cause of action.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Gonzalez agreed with the result but disagreed with the notion that a shareholder must represent any sort of class at
all in order to have standing to bring a derivative suit.69 Justice Gonzalez

pointed out that the provision of the Texas Business Corporation Act that
enumerates the requirements for maintaining a derivative suit contains no
requirement that a plaintiff must represent any other shareholders.7 0
Rather, rule 42(a) only comes into play when there are other similarly situated shareholders who would constitute a class. Justice Gonzalez concluded
that only if such a class exists would a plaintiff be required to fairly and
adequately represent that class. 7' Justice Gonzalez's opinion articulates the
better analysis to be used in shareholder derivative suits by not examining
rule 42(a) if a class is not present and instead focusing solely on the Texas
Business Corporation Act.
In Faour v. Faour72 a corporation filed suit to collect a debt owed to the
corporation by a minority shareholder. The shareholder filed a counterclaim
against the corporation and its president, claiming that the president had
breached his fiduciary duties by failing to hold shareholders and directors
meetings, suppressing the payment of dividends, allowing the dissipation of
corporate assets, failing to supply requested financial records, making improper corporate loans, and causing the corporation's stock to decline in
value.
The Texarkana court of appeals in a succinct and scholarly decision held
that an officer of a corporation owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation and
not to any shareholder individually.7 3 An officer owes fiduciary duties to the
corporation and, thus, to the shareholders in a collective sense, but no fiduciary relationship exists between the officer and an individual shareholder absent some express contract or other special relationship between the officer
and the shareholder. 74 The court reasoned that, even though individual
shareholders suffer indirectly through loss of corporate earnings and de66. Id. at 163.
67. Id.
68. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
69. 796 S.W.2d at 163 (Gonzales, J., concurring).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. (citing TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14 (Vernon 1980)).
Id at 164.
789 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied).
Id. at 621.
Id. at 621-22.
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creases in the value of their shares of stock, the cause of action for injury to
the corporation vests in the corporation, not in the individual shareholders. 75 A shareholder's derivative suit brought in the name of the corporation
is the proper method to recover for damages to the corporation. 76 Here, the
shareholder had clearly counterclaimed individually and not derivatively.7
The court found no evidence of any fiduciary relationship between the president and the shareholder other than the corporate relationship, 78 but noted
that a shareholder may sue to protect individual rights, notwithstanding an
additional cause of action vested in the corporation.7 9 An individual shareholder's cause of action arises only where there is a violation of a contractual
or other duty owed directly to the shareholder. 80
Thywissen v. Cron81 interpreted the duties owed by shareholders to each
other in dealing with corporate assets. H.J. Thywissen and Myrven H. Cron
formed Flexbin Corporation, which subsequently acquired the machinery
and inventory of Krafcor in exchange for $150,000 in cash and a note for
approximately $283,000. Concerned that Flexbin's note might be transferred to a competitor, Thywissen negotiated into the. sales contract a right
of first refusal requiring Krafcor to offer the note to Thywissen if Krafcor
intended to sell, assign, or transfer the note. Thywissen obtained the right of
first refusal in his name alone, but he did so with Cron's consent and understanding that such right was an asset of Flexbin Corporation in the same
manner that the note was a liability.
Twenty months later, Thywissen and Cron sold their Flexbin Corporation
stock to Augusta Bag. Since the note was not reacquired by the closing date
of the sale of stock, the sales contract provided that the right of first refusal
would be a separate asset and not part of the stock sale. In the meantime,
Krafcor filed for bankruptcy and Flexbin offered to purchase its note for
$92,000. After approval by the bankruptcy court of the offer, Thywissen
notified Augusta Bag of his intent to exercise the right of first refusal. Augusta Bag agreed to pay Thywissen $184,000 in exchange for canceling the
note, and Thywissen paid Krafcor as debtor in possession $92,000 to obtain
Flexbin's note. The transaction netted Thywissen $92,000, of which he offered to pay Cron $7,213. As a former forty percent stockholder of Flexbin,
Cron sued Thywissen to recoup his proportionate share of the gain on the
transaction. The trial court granted recovery to Cron for his share of the
note proceeds, and the court of appeals affirmed.82
Although initial review of various aspects of the case may raise concerns
about Texas corporate law, the basis for the holding does comport with prior
75. Id. at 622.
76. Faour, 789 S.W.2d at 622.
77. Id. (citing pleading requirements for derivative suit set forth in TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT
ANN. art. 5.14(B)(2) (Vernon 1980)).
78. Id. at 623.
79. Id. at 622.
80. Faour, 789 S.W.2d at 622.
81. 781 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
82. Id. at 687.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

cases. The evidence established that the right of first refusal was a corporate
asset. This corporate asset was excluded from the sale of Flexbin Corporation's stock to Augusta Bag, and thereafter Thywissen held this asset as a
corporate trustee for all former shareholders. As corporate trustee, Thywissen owed a fiduciary duty to deal fairly with the shareholders with respect to
the corporate asset and the disposition of any proceeds generated therefrom.8 3 Based on the foregoing, the court correctly required Thywissen to
tender proceeds from an asset held in his name to his former fellow
shareholders.
In O'Neill v. Church'sFried Chicken, Inc.84 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit allowed a former shareholder to recover, from the surviving
corporation, attorneys' fees incurred in an action brought derivatively
against the former directors.8 5 The shareholder claimed that the directors
breached their fiduciary duties in implementing certain defensive measures
to ward off a tender offer that ultimately was completed. In that case, Biscuit Investments, Inc. (Biscuit) announced a cash tender offer at $8.00 per
share for all the outstanding shares of Church's stock. The offer expired on
February 19, 1989. Church's directors determined the offer was not in the
best interests of the shareholders and recommended that the shareholders
reject it. In addition, the directors attempted to stall the takeover by adopting a poison pill device and establishing golden parachutes for senior executives. Seeking the court's permission to proceed derivatively, O'Neill alleged
that the board's opposition to the tender offer was an improper attempt at
entrenchment and a breach of their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the
shareholders. She prayed for an injunction to facilitate the acquisition of
Church's through a tender offer and the recovery of attorneys' fees. She also
sought a preliminary injunction for the removal of the poison pill.
On January 18, 1989, the board announced its decision that a sale of
Church's would be in the best interests of the shareholders and that a thirtyday auction would be concluded on February 18, 1989. On February 15,
1989, Biscuit tendered a revised bid for all the outstanding shares of
Church's stock at $11.00 per share. The directors approved the revised bid
and eliminated the poison pill. On March 21, 1989, the tender was completed, and Biscuit mailed payment directly to all Church's shareholders,
thus rendering O'Neill's derivative action moot. On March 17, 1989,
O'Neill petitioned the district court for attorneys' fees and expenses against
Church's. The trial court awarded O'Neill approximately $412,000.86
The court noted that Texas law allows shareholders who pursue a successful derivative action to recover their attorneys' fees from the corporation if
they show that they conferred a substantial benefit to the corporation
through their efforts.8 7 Although the board's decision to approve the tender
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 686.
910 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265.
Id.
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offer rendered O'Neill's action moot, the district court held that the burden
is on the corporation to show no causal connection between the shareholder's action and the decision of the directors to approve Biscuit's offer.88
The district court found that O'Neill's prosecution of her suit did in fact
affect the board's decision to sell, resulting in an increased value of Church's
stock and a substantial benefit to Church's and its shareholders.8 9 On appeal, Church's conceded that O'Neill's prosecution of her lawsuit would justify a judgment for fees against the selling shareholders on a common benefit
theory. Church's contended, however, that the district court erred in finding
that the corporation, rather than the individual shareholders, received a substantial benefit. Church's argued that paying the higher price to acquire the
stock actually injured the current owner of Church's.
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Fifth Circuit considered the
cases cited by Church's, which seemed to hold that a plaintiff could not
recover attorneys' fees where payment by the corporation would not act as a
conduit for shifting fees to the beneficiary class of shareholders. 90 The Fifth
Circuit distinguished these cases, however, on the basis that O'Neill brought
the lawsuit as a derirative claim. 9 1 The Fifth Circuit concluded that since
any misconduct on the part of the directors in reacting to the tender offer
would harm all shareholders in proportion to their share of ownership,
O'Neill's action was a derivative claim, and as such, the benefit may be
deemed to have accrued to the corporation.
The result appeared to contravene the traditional purpose of the common
benefit rule. 92 The present shareholder, who was forced to pay the higher
price and thus enjoyed no benefit from the action, would be taxed for
O'Neill's cost instead of the former shareholders who did benefit. The court
reasoned, however, that a purchaser of a corporation also purchased its lia93
bilities and that Biscuit was certainly aware of O'Neill's derivative actions.
As such, Biscuit could have accounted for the cost of any potential fee
awards in the calculation .of its tender offer or could have otherwise made
arrangements to shift the cost of fees to the former shareholders. 94 The
Fifth Circuit further justified its holding by noting that O'Neill had no other
practical means to recover her expenses in producing the common benefit
95
that her derivative action bestowed.
This decision will present potential tender offerors with another potential
88. Church's, 910 F.2d at 266. The principle followed by the district court was established in Delaware. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Palley, 310 A.2d 635 (Del. 1973);
Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 43 Del. Ch. 252, 223 A.2d 384 (1966); Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit
Corp., 209 A.2d 459 (Del. Ch. 1949). In Barton v. Drummond Co., 636 F.2d 978, 984-85 (5th

Cir. 1981), this principle was deemed applicable under Delaware law as applied by the Fifth
Circuit.
89. Church's, 910 F.2d at 266.

90. Christensen v. Kiewit-Murdock Inv. Corp., 815 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied,
484 U.S. 908 (1987).
91. Church's, 910 F.2d at 267.

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Church's, 910 F.2d at 267.
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liability to include in determining an offering price. If the tender offeror's
bid is increased as a result of the actions of a derivative suit, then, following
the court's analysis, an offeror would be well advised to decrease its bid by a
cost per share equal to the amount of potential fee awards. As with any
potential liability, factoring this cost will be both subjective and subject to
uncertainty. This case serves as a warning: If you bid for a Texas corporation that is or may be affected by a shareholder's derivative suit, then factor
into your bid the fees and expenses of such suit. This is a trap for the unwary and a disincentive for anyone seeking to acquire a Texas corporation.
In Horton v. Robinson 96 the El Paso court of appeals addressed the validity of an individual shareholder's cause of action against other shareholders
who breach a contract or fiduciary duty owed directly by them to the aggrieved shareholder, which breach results in damage to the corporation. In
Horton three individuals, Robinson, Horton, and Griggs, entered into a
shareholders' agreement upon the formation of a financial services corporation. Pursuant to the terms of their agreement, each would own twenty percent of the corporation's stock, and profits were to be "distributed prorata,
331/3 each."197 After a disagreement with Horton and Griggs, Robinson left
the corporation. Pursuant to the agreement, Robinson continued to request
his share of the corporation's profits and sued Horton, Griggs, and the corporation to recover damages for the breach by Horton and Griggs of the
shareholders' agreement. In addition, Robinson claimed that Horton and
Griggs breached an independent fiduciary duty owed to him.
The court acknowledged the general proposition that individual shareholders have no cause of action to recover damages sustained by a corporation. 98 The court, however, held Robinson's pleading sufficient to support a
recovery in his individual capacity based upon the breach of Horton's fiduciary relationship to Robinson.9 9 The fact that Horton had been Robinson's
attorney, together with the fact that Horton had violated the shareholders'
agreement formed the basis of the court's holding.10' In affirming the trial
court's determination that Horton and Griggs were liable in their individual
capacities and reversing the trial court's determination that the corporation
violated fiduciary duties or committed a civil conspiracy, the court correctly
noted that a corporation cannot be held liable for the acts of a principal that
are not referable to corporate business or authorized by the corporation.' 0 '
96. 776 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, n.w.h.).
97. Id. at 262.
98. Id. at 263; see Massachusetts v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398, 168 S.W.2d 216 (1942), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 210 (1943); Group Medical & Surgical Serv., Inc. v. Leong, 750 S.W.2d 791
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, writ denied).
99. Horton, 776 S.W.2d at 263.
100. Id. The court cited the general rule discussed by the San Antonio court of appeals in
Morrison v. St. Anthony Hotel, San Antonio, 290 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which the court stated that "in a proper case, where a majority
stockholder has abused its discretion and has maliciously suppressed the payment of dividends,
a stockholder may assert a cause of action for damages and may compel the declaration of
dividends." Id.
101. Id. at 267 (citing Rhodes, Inc. v. Duncan, 623 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1981, no writ)).
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In finding that Horton, Robinson's long-time friend and former attorney,
had breached a fiduciary duty to his fellow shareholder, thus allowing
Robinson to recover damages sustained by the corporation, the court followed the language of the Texas Supreme Court in Kinzbach Tool Co. v.
Corbett-Wallace Corp.102 and Thigpen v. Locke. 10 3 The Horton court held
that the term "fiduciary" includes informal relations that may arise from
moral, social, domestic, or purely personal relationships when it is determined that one party trusts and relies upon another, and is not limited to
those "technical fiduciary relations."' °4 If Texas courts followed this reasoning, the general rule that individual shareholders have no cause of action
to recover damages sustained by a corporation 0 5 would be swallowed by
what many Texas courts perceive as the exception. 10 6 This would permit the
rule to become the exception.
III. DIRECTOR INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS
In University Savings Association v. Burnap,0 7 a case of first impression,
the Houston court of appeals provided helpful insight into the indemnification provisions of the Texas Business Corporation Act. Walter S. Burnap
was a shareholder, officer, and director of Austin Savings Association
(ASA). Burnap participated in the negotiation of the sale of a number of
shares of ASA common stock prior to an offer made by University Savings
Association (University) to merge with and thus acquire all the shares of
ASA stock. Seven individual shareholders of ASA sued Burnap alleging
various violations of federal and state securities laws in connection with the
sales of their shares of stock prior to the announcement of the offer by University. The complaint alleged that as a director of ASA, Burnap owed a
duty to the shareholders to disclose the pending negotiations with University. Burnap won each of the cases on motions for summary judgment.
University denied Burnap's subsequent request for indemnification under
the by-laws of ASA. The by-laws provided for indemnification of any party
defendant if "such person is made a party solely by reason of his being or
having been a director, officer or employee of this association .... 108 University denied indemnification because the complaint did not allege that Burnap acted illegally or violated a duty as an officer, director, or employee of
ASA. University argued that Burnap's alleged unlawful activity could not
have been the performance of a duty of a director. If Burnap had been acting solely as a shareholder, he would have had no duty to advise shareholders of his plans to sell his stock.109 The critical question in examining this
102. 138 Tex. 565, 160 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
103. 363 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1962).
104. Horton, 776 S.W.2d at 265.
105. See Massachusetts v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398, 168 S.W.2d 216 (1942), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 210 (1943).
106. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
107. 786 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, n.w.h.).
108. Id. at 424.
109. Id. at 426.
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type of issue should be whether the claimant would have been named as a
defendant if he was not a director and not whether the claimant was acting
within his capacity as a director. The facts are clear that but for Burnap
being a director, he would not have been named a defendant.°10 Holding in
favor of Burnap, the court of appeals analogized the interpretation of indemnification provisions with the determination of an insurance company's duty
to defend under an insurance contract.1 11 Specifically, the court held that
from the
the duty to defend an action is determined as a matter of law solely
11 2
contract.
the
of
provisions
the
of
light
in
pleadings
the
of
face
IV.

THE TEXAS SECURITIES ACT AND THE DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES AcT

In Frizzell v. Cook 113 the San Antonio court of appeals held that an individual can bring an action for securities fraud under the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (DTPA), and that such a cause of action is not pre-empted by
the Texas Securities Act (TSA).114 The plaintiff retained the defendants, a
brokerage firm and certain of its employees, to provide investment and counselling services with regard to life insurance proceeds received upon the
death of the plaintiff's husband. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants
engaged in tortious conduct in connection with the services provided, including misrepresentations relating to specific sales and purchases of securities,
and the "churning" of her account. 115
The court noted that the cumulative provisions of the DTPA prevent a
violation of a law other than the DTPA from automatically becoming a violation of the DTPA. 1 6 Specifically, the DTPA provides that the actions of a
person which constitute a violation of another law may also be the basis for a
DTPA action if such acts are proscribed by the DTPA, but no double recov117
ery under the DTPA and the other law may result from the same acts.
Although the rights and remedies of the TSA are in addition to any other
right or remedy that may exist at law or in equity, the court noted that the
DTPA contains no exemptions for securities transactions.1 18
The court then examined certain defenses to the TSA, compared those
defenses with certain defenses provided in the DTPA, and found no funda110. If ASA had been an entity governed by the Texas Business Corporation Act, then the
bylaws would not have even been required to be consulted. By statute, a corporation is obligated to indemnify a director against reasonable expenses incurred by him in connection with a
proceeding in which he was named a defendant because he is or was a director if he was wholly
successful, on the merits or otherwise, in the defense of the proceeding. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 2.02-1H (Vernon Supp. 1991). As the bylaws and the statute are similar, this decision is indicative of the outcome that would have been reached if the statute was at issue.
111. University Savings Association, 786 S.W.2d at 426.
112. Id.
113. 790 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
114. Id. at 47.
115. Id. at 42-43.
116. Id. at 44.
117. Frizzell, 790 S.W.2d at 44.
118. Id. at 44-45.
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mental inconsistency between them.11 9 In particular, the TSA contains a
due diligence defense that precludes liability if the plaintiff knew about the
alleged untruth or omission, or if the defendant did not know about the
.untruth or omission, and could not have known about it with the exercise of
reasonable care. 120 Similarly, the DTPA provides that a cause of action
arises where a "deceptive practice constitutes a producing cause of actual
damages". 1 21 The court found that there can be no producing cause of damages if the plaintiff knew about the untruth or omission,1 22 and that the clear
language of the DTPA provides a defense when a defendant fails to disclose
information that the defendant did not know.1 23 Another DTPA defense
arises when a defendant gives a consumer notice of the defendant's reliance
on written information provided by a third party, so long as the defendant
did not know and could not reasonably have known such information contained false statements. 124 Thus, the court concluded that under both the
TSA and the DTPA, a plaintiff who knows of an untruth or omission may
not recover in a cause of action based upon that untruth or omission.12 5
Similarly, under both statutes, a defendant is not liable for his failure to
disclose information that he did not know and could not have known with
the exercise of reasonable care. According to the San Antonio court of appeals, statutory defenses provided by the TSA and DTPA defenses are

consistent. 126
Based on the theory that the statute most recently enacted prevails, the
court concluded that the DTPA would control over the TSA regardless of
whether the defense provisions were consistent.1 27 Because the legislature
enacted the relevant provisions of the DTPA after the enactment of the relevant provisions of the TSA, a plaintiff could still maintain a DTPA action
for securities fraud even if inconsistencies are found to exist.1 28 Finally, the
court concluded that, while there can be only one recovery for the same
deceptive act, because of the chronological order of enactment of the relevant provisions of the statutes, and because of their cumulative provisions,
1 29
actions for securities fraud could arise under the statutes.
With the specter of treble damages now overhanging all securities transactions in Texas, the economic development of business in Texas is being further threatened by the same Texas courts that have exhibited a propensity to
disregard the corporate identity with respect to contractual obligations. In
light of the courts' lack of recognition of the legislative response in article
119.
120.
121.
1987)).
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. (citing TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 A(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991)).
Frizzell, 790 S.W.2d at 45 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon
Id.
Id. (citing TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(23) (Vernon 1987)).
Id. (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.506(a)(2) (Vernon 1987)).

125. Frizzell, 790 S.W.2d at 45.

126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 46.
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2.21 of the Texas Business Corporation Act to the Castleberry decision, the
authors are not hopeful that any legislative response to correct the court's
decision in Frizzell will be followed by the courts.

